ABSTRACT Algorithm substitution attack (ASA) on signatures can have severe consequences as the authentication services of numerous systems and applications rely on signature schemes. In this paper, we present a highly efficient ASA on the widely-used digital signature algorithm (DSA). Compared with the generic ASAs on signature schemes proposed in the literature, our attack provides fast and undetectable subversion, which can extract the user's private signing key by collecting the maximum three signatures arbitrarily. Moreover, our ASA is proven to be robust against state reset. We implemented the proposed ASA by replacing the original DSA in Libgcrypt (a popular cryptographic library used in many applications) with our subverted DSA. Our experiment shows that the user's private key can readily be recovered once the subverted DSA is used to sign messages. In our implementation, various measures have been considered to significantly reduce the possibility of detection through comparing the running time of the original DSA and the subverted one (i.e. timing analysis). To our knowledge, this is the first implementation of the ASA in practice, which shows that the ASA is a real threat rather than only theoretical speculation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Algorithm Substitution Attack (ASA). We trust cryptography expecting that it will provide a maximum level of security and privacy. If cryptography turns out to be subverted so that it leaks the critical information of a user to the third party secretly, we would seriously be concerned about its impact on security and privacy. For this reason, many were surprised and even shocked by Snowden's revelation that the subversion of certain cryptographic algorithms happened [13] . In response to this, Bellare, Paterson and Rogaway came up with the formal notion called ''algorithm substitution attack (ASA)'' [6] . Roughly, the ASA enables an adversary, often called ''big brother'', to replace some parts of a legitimate cryptographic scheme or protocol with a modified one so that it subliminally leaks the crucial information about a secret key or a confidential message to the adversary.
ASA on signatures. The focus of this paper is ASA on signature schemes. One of the possible real-world scenarios can be described as follows: It is common nowadays that a crypto library is embedded as a subcomponent of commercial software or hardware, which is installed and patched by
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Junaid Arshad. the vendor. The problem is that if the vendor is malicious or enforced to act maliciously by an external party, it can easily replace the regular crypto library with a subverted one to obtain the victim's private key. If the subverted library does not require any hidden communication channel nor result in degradation of performance, the victim cannot detect any difference and will use the subverted library unwittingly.
Although ''kleptography'' proposed by Young and Yung dealt with the subversion of signature schemes [30] , the first formal treatment of the subject matter in the context of ASA was made by Ateniese et al [2] . Their subverted signature scheme is generic but inefficient. A more efficient ASA on a certain group of signatures was proposed very recently by Liu et al [16] . (Note that these related works will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.) However, there still remain some important problems to address, which we discuss in what follows.
Realizing ASA. We came to the realization that none of the ASAs proposed in the literature has been implemented although the original motivation for ASA is closely related to the practice of cryptographic algorithms in the real world. Moreover, discovering ASAs on widely-used cryptographic algorithms is important as they are already deployed in numerous applications and their ASA vulnerability has deep impact on the security of those applications. These have motivated us to pursue research with two directions: how to come up with practical ASAs on known cryptographic schemes and how to realize them efficiently.
State reset. According to [6] , subverted cryptographic schemes are classified into statefull and stateless ones. As stateless schemes do not maintain state, there is no need to concern about state resets, which usually happen with rebooting or cloning to create a virtual machine. They, however, can lead to detection when it comes to stateful schemes. Nevertheless, state reset has not been captured by the definition of detectability for ASA on signature schemes, previously considered in the literature. Our detectability notion for stateful subverted signature schemes includes state reset and our subverted schemes are analyzed based on it.
Our contributions. We present an efficient ASA on the DSA [10] , which we sometimes refer to as a ''subverted DSA scheme''. As follows is a summary of our results:
• By making use of the randomized component of a signature contiguous to the current one as a source of randomness, we were able to design a conceptually simple yet highly efficient subversion on the DSA: It only takes a maximum of any three consecutive signatures to extract a private signing key, which makes our subversion remarkably practical.
• We refined the formal definition of the undetectability for ASA on signatures so that it can incorporate state reset. We proved that our subverted DSA is undetectable and robust against state reset. To our knowledge, this is the first work dealing with state reset for ASA on signatures formally.
• We implemented the proposed ASA by substituting the original DSA provided in the Libgcrypt library [12] with our subverted DSA. Our implementation carefully considered countermeasures against the possible detection of subversion by comparing the running time of the subverted signature with that of the original DSA. On Generalization. We are aware that the proposed subversion technique can be generalized to cover the signature schemes that have a structure similar to the DSA, such as Schnorr and the ECDSA. (We did show in this paper that our ASA can be applied to the Schnorr signature [24] .) However, we do not present a complete specification of generalization in this version of the paper as its focus is an efficient realization of ASA on the mentioned signature schemes rather than a theoretical generalization, which may result in some redundancy.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we review and discuss the related work in detail. In Section III, we provide definitions of key extraction and undetectability for subverted signature schemes. In Section IV, we present our subverted DSA scheme. Our implementation of the subverted scheme and its analysis are presented in Section V. Concluding remarks will follow in Section VI. As an additional instance of the proposed ASA, we present an ASA against the Schnorr signature scheme in Appendix.
II. RELATED WORK
The consequences of ASA on signature schemes can be catastrophic [2] . -The attacker's goal in this case may be to forge signatures on particular messages. Perhaps his intention goes beyond this and may want to steal signers' private keys, e.g., to impersonate individuals or to forge certificates. In this section, we elaborate on the previous work on subverting signature schemes.
Early work. Young and Yung pioneered research on ASA, which they called ''kleptography'' [29] . In their series of work [29] - [32] , they presented kleptographic attacks, described as SETUP (Secretly Embedded Trapdoor with Universal Protection) against various cryptographic schemes including RSA encryption, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, Schnorr, ElGamal and DSA signatures. Our ASA is inspired by their work, especially through exploiting the arithmetic structure of discrete-logarithm based signatures to extract a private key. (More discussion on this will follow in the beginning of Section IV.) Their basic idea is to exploit the structural vulnerability of many discrete-logarithm based signatures.
-Security problems can arise in those signatures if a nonuniform value for an ephemeral component (nonce) in the signature is used [31] , [32] . This exploit has been known for a long time. Notable results include Simmons' seminal work on subliminal channel [25] , [26] and Nguyen and Shparlinski's attack on DSA using partially known nonces [19] .
The kleptographic attacks from [30] and [32] require the adversary to locate one particular subverted signature (possibly from many) to extract a private key. To achieve this, the subverted scheme needs to maintain state to ''flag'' such a signature and transmit it to the adversary. We envision that in practice, this is harder than it looks since there are many subverted signatures that the victim will have generated and the adversary has to closely monitor them to locate one particular signature.
We also point out that their attack uses a deterministic subversion key, which can lead to detection of ASA if a state reset occurs through a reboot or cloning a virtual machine [6] [4] . In other words, the same signature can be outputted twice in the case of a state reset, which renders the attack detectable as the non-subverted scheme should be randomized.
Ateniese et al.'s work. Ateniese et al. presented two generic ASAs on any randomized signature schemes [2] . Their first attack is based on Bellare et al.'s ASA technique [6] , whereby the adversary can extract each bit of the secret key from a vector of ciphertexts generated by a subverted encryption algorithm using biased randomness. Ateniese et al. applied this technique to mount ASA on signature schemes which possess sufficient randomness (i.e. the signature schemes that contain as many random bits as the size of the secret signing key). The second attack that Ateniese et al. proposed is applicable to a group of signature schemes which have little randomness.
Although Ateniese et al.'s ASAs can be applied to a large class of signature schemes, compared with theirs, our ASA on discrete-logarithm based signature schemes has the following merits.
( The above two attacks need to maintain state, i.e., they are stateful. In the first attack, the state needs to locate at least the first and last signatures (among the collected signatures), which will be used to exfiltrate the first and last bit of a private key respectively. Similarly, the state of the second attack needs to locate the first and last signatures, which will be used to extract the first and last chunks of bits of a private key respectively. Although Ateniese et al. [2] claim that their attack can be made stateless by providing the state as a message to the subverted signing algorithm, we point out that this is only possible when the adversary has control over inputs to the subverted signing algorithm, which may not always be the case in practice. In contrast, our ASA does not require this assumption. Even though the state should also be maintained in our ASA (i.e., our ASA is also stateful), its purpose is not to locate or flag (subverted) signatures to extract signing keys but rather to perform alternate operations for subverted signature generation. [16] . Although their ASA uses a similar idea to divide the subverted signing algorithm into two parts to boost efficiency of the attack, we point out the following difference and a flaw in their argument.
1) The key difference between Liu et al's work and ours is that our ASA is symmetric subversion [2] , [4] , [6] while their is asymmetric one, which was proposed by Young and Yung [30] , [32] Other related work. Apart from signatures, active research on ASA against encryption and its prevention has been conducted since Bellare et al.'s seminal work [6] . Various types of ASAs on symmetric encryption schemes have been proposed by Bellare et al. [4] , [6] . In particular, the ASA presented in [4] is a stateless attack, which removes the limitation of stateful ASAs presented in [6] .
As a prevention measure for ASA on symmetric encryption, the works [3] , [4] , [6] recommended deterministic algorithms. Bellare and Hoang extended the result to public key encryption [3] . (Ateniese et al. also proposed a deterministic solution for ASA against signatures [2] .) Others developed somewhat different approaches including the cryptographic reverse firewall (RF), which resides between the user's computer and the outside environment to protect cryptographic schemes and protocols from insider attacks [17] . More recently Russell at al. proposed a generic technique for designing public key encryption that is semantically secure against ASA, which utilizes inter-component checking techniques with offline component [21] .
Though a number of attempts have been made to guard against ASAs, each solution has its own merits and shortcomings. Hence, we can cautiously state that no perfect solution for ASA has emerged yet.
III. NOTIONS OF SUBVERTED SIGNATURE
In this section, we provide formal definitions for the syntax, key extraction and undetectability of a subverted signature VOLUME 7, 2019 scheme. Compared with the regular digital signature, the subverted signature needs a ''subversion key'' for its operation.
Syntax for subverted signature schemes. We now provide the precise syntax for a subverted signature scheme.
Definition 1: Let SIG = (Gen, Sign, Verify) be a regular (non-subverted) signature scheme. The Gen algorithm takes a security parameter λ as input and produces a private and public key pair (sk, pk). The Sign algorithm generates a signature σ on a message m. The Verify algorithm checks whether a given signature σ on the message m is valid or not, outputting 1 or 0 respectively. A subverted signature scheme for SIG, which we denote by SIG = (Gen, Sign) is defined as follows.
• The subversion key generation algorithm subk ← Gen(1 ): Taking a security parameter as input, this algorithm generates a subversion key subk.
• The subverted signing algorithm (σ , ι) ← Sign(subk, sk, m, ι): Taking a subversion key subk as input, a private key sk, a message m and a state ι, this algorithm produces a subverted signatureσ on the message m with an updated state ι.
We require that the subverted signatureσ (on the message m) can be verified in the same way as the non-subverted signature scheme is verified, i.e., 1/0 ← Verify(pk,σ , m).
The above definition is similar to Ateniese et al.'s [2] but we have made the generation of a subversion key and its presence as input to a subverted signing algorithm more explicit (rather than assuming the presence of ''hard-wired arbitrary auxiliary information'' as described in [2] ), following the description style of Bellare et al.'s work in [6] and [4] .
Note that in the definition above the subverted signing algorithm is defined as stateful by default, taking state ι as input and returning the updated state. (In our subverted schemes which will be presented later, state is only used internally and is never returned externally by the signing algorithm.)
Key extraction. The most serious attack against a signature scheme may be the private key extraction. Usually extracting a private signing key from regular signature schemes is deemed infeasible but this is not the case when it comes to a subverted signature scheme. -The adversary (Big Brother) should be able to recover the private signing key efficiently from the number of subverted signatures obtained. In the formal definition below, we formulate the key extraction in the subverted signature scheme.
Definition 2: Let B be an adversary. Let SIG = (Gen, Sign, Verify) be a signature scheme. Suppose that SIG = (Gen, Sign) is a subverted signature scheme for SIG. Let Q S be the number of signing queries. Consider the following game:
where the probability is taken over the random coins used by B, as well as the random coins used in the game.
We remark that the notion of key extraction is not formally defined in [2] , even though their attack implies it. Another remark is that the key extraction is not mandated as a security goal but as an attack goal, which is a reasonable requirement for subversion as the similar notion for encryption is defined in [4] .
Undetectability under state reset. We now define what it means for a subverted signature scheme to be secure from the adversary's (Big Brother's) point of view. Intuitively, an ordinary user, who does not possess the adversary's subversion key, should not be able to detect that a signature has been created by a subverted signing algorithm. On the other hand, it is natural to assume that the user, who is trying to detect subversion, has access to the private signing key since the user of a concerned signature scheme (not an outsider) is usually more interested in detecting subversion. Therefore, in the following definition of undetectability, a user (any party that is interested in detecting subversion) is given the private key sk that corresponds to a public key pk.
Another aspect one can consider in the definition of undetectability is state reset [4] , [6] . This can be achieved by giving the user access to a reset oracle. -When this oracle is invoked, state used in the subverted signature scheme is initialized (reset). State reset obviously makes the user more powerful but it was not considered in the previous undetectability notions of subverted signatures presented [2] and [16] .
As follows is our formal definition of undetectability. Definition 3: Let A be a user (represented as an algorithm). Let SIG = (Gen, Sign, Verify) be a signature scheme. For a subverted signature scheme SIG = (Gen, Sign), consider the following game:
where the probability is taken over the random coins used by A, as well as the random coins used in the game. We say that SIG is undetectable if for all probabilistic polynomialtime users A, there exists a negligible function (λ) such that Adv detect A,SIG,SIG (λ) ≤ (λ). Note that the undetectability of a subverted signature scheme implies that the verification algorithm Verify should output the same result regardless of whether a subverted signature or a non-subverted one on the same message is provided as input, i.e.
The above definition is related to Bellare et al.'s detection notion for a subverted symmetric encryption scheme [6] . It is also closely related to the similar notion ''secret undetectability'' presented in Ateniese et al.'s work [2] (which was used in [16] ), but the key difference is that in our definition, the generation and presence of the subversion key subk is more explicit as mentioned earlier in this section.
It should be remarked that while the above undetectability definition provides a good theoretical framework for designing subversion for signature schemes, it does not capture other possible practical attacks such as the timing analysis whereby a user can detect subversion by analyzing the execution time of given signature schemes.
IV. OUR SUBVERTED DSA SCHEME
Our subverted DSA scheme exploits the random nonce generation of the original DSA: A nonce of every (j + 1)-th DSA signature (for j mod 2 = 0) is generated not by choosing a uniform element but by computing a Pseudo-Random Function (PRF)-output taking the subversion key and the first component of the j-th signature as input. This technique leads to highly efficient subversion.
Description of the proposed subverted DSA scheme. First, we describe the original DSA scheme as follows. Let DSA = (Gen DSA , Sign DSA , Verify DSA ) denote the DSA scheme. The key generation algorithm Gen DSA produces pk = (G, q, g, y, G, H) and sk = (G, q, g, x, G, H) , where G is a cyclic group of prime order q, generated by g, y = g x for the uniform x ∈ Z q ; G : {0, 1} * → Z q and H : {0, 1} * → Z q are cryptographic hash functions. Taking a message m and a private key x as input, the signing algorithm Sign DSA generates a signature σ = (r, s) such that r = G(g k ) for random k ∈ Z q and s = k −1 (H(m) + xr) mod q. Taking pk = (G, q, g, y, G, H) of DSA, a message m, a signature σ = (r, s) as input, Verify DSA returns 1 if r = G(g H(m)s −1 y rs −1 ) and 0 otherwise.
We now describe our subverted DSA scheme DSA = (Gen DSA , Sign DSA ) as follows:
• Subversion key generation Gen DSA : Taking 1 as input, select a PRF F : {0, 1} × {0, 1} ρ → {0, 1} n , pick κ ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random and return subk = (descF, κ), where ''descF'' denotes the description of F.
• Subverted sign Sign DSA : Taking sk = (G, q, g, x, G, H) of DSA, a message m, a private signing key x and a subversion key subk and state ι = (j, τ ) as input, where j and τ are initialized to 0, perform the following: If j = 0 mod 2 Pick k ∈ Z q at random and compute r = G(g k ) and
Note that the ASAs on DSA presented in [31] and [32] , and the generic subverted signature schemes from [2] all require information on state to be sent to the adversary in order to extract the private key. (The state is used to indicate which signature or bit is needed for private key extraction.) In many circumstances, sending the state information will not be trivial. In contrast, by collecting any three consecutive signatures maximum, the adversary can easily extract of the private key from our subverted DSA.
Moreover, our subverted DSA resists a state reset. The intuition for it is as follows. Whenever a reset query is made, j is set to 0, which causes the subverted signing algorithm to output a regular DSA signature upon receiving a signing query. Hence a sequence of the subverted signatures always starts with a valid DSA signature in which r is always an uniform element even after the reset. (We assume that under a sate reset, seed values for creating uniform elements are not reused, which is also assumed in [6] and [4] .) This is proven formally in the proof of Theorem 2.
Finally we remark that the technique used to construct the above subverted DSA scheme can readily be applied to other discrete-logarithm based signature schemes including the Schnorr signature [24] , whose subverted scheme is presented in Appendix. It is also possible that the technique can further be generalized to cover all the signature schemes of a similar type but we do not pursue it in this work since the main goal of cryptomalware is to realize efficient ASA rather than to design a generic framework, which often does not result in optimized efficiency of (subverted) cryptographic schemes.
Key extraction. We show that the private signing key of the DSA scheme can easily be extracted from utilizing our subverted DSA. Any pair of consecutive subverted signatures that starts with even index j (i.e. j = 0 mod 2) VOLUME 7, 2019 can reveal the private signing key x. Even in the event that j is odd, by selecting a signature that immediately comes after the failed pair, it can be used to extract the private signing key with certainty. A formal proof is as follows.
Theorem 1: Suppose that three consecutive signatures output by the subverted DSA scheme DSA are given. Then, the signing key of the DSA signature scheme can be extracted with probability 1.
Proof
Suppose now that j = 0 mod 2. Then B can recover the secret signing key x using its subversion key subk = (κ, F) as follows:
Note that since
the above algorithm succeeds in extracting the private key x. Hence, B extracts the signing key with probability 1. Now, suppose that j mod 2 = 0. Then, (j + 1) mod 2 = 0 and hence B can use the last two consecutive subverted signaturesσ j+1 = (r , s ) andσ j+2 = (r , s ) to extract the signing key with probability 1 in exactly the same way it was done withσ j andσ j+1 . Thus, Adv extract B,DSA (λ) = 1. Undetectability. We show that the subverted DSA scheme is undetectable. As a preliminary, we review the definition of a pseudorandom function (PRF).
Definition 4: Let F : {0, 1} × {0, 1} ρ → {0, 1} n be a function taking a key µ ∈ {0, 1} and an input x ∈ {0, 1} ρ . Let A be an adversary with oracle access. Assume that Func n ρ be a set of all functions from {0, 1} ρ to {0, 1} n . Consider the following two games:
. F is said to be a pseudorandom function if there exits a negligible function ( ) such that Adv A,F ( ) ≤ ( ), where the probabilities are taken over the randomness used in A and the randomness used in the experiment.
Now we prove the following theorem. Proof: The proof proceeds with the following sequence of games.
Game 0. This game is the same as the real undetectability game Detect A,DSA,DSA (λ). For completeness, we describe it as follows.
Let A be an adversary making Q S signing queries as described in Definition 3. Suppose that A is given pk = (G, p, g, y, G, H) and sk = (x, pk) .
After setting up the private and public key pair, the game specifies a PRF F : {0, 1} × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n , initializes j = 0 and τ = ∅. The game then picks b ∈ {0, 1} at random.
If b = 0, on receiving each signing query m from A, the game responds A with a valid DSA signature. On receiving a reset query rt, set j = 0 and τ = ∅.
If Game 1. This game modifies the previous game in such a way that when b = 0, it answers A's queries in the same way as the previous game but when b = 1,k (when j = 1 mod 2) is not computed using the PRF but by selecting a uniform random string. As follows is the detailed description of the modified game:
Set T = ∅. If b = 0, on receiving each signing query m from A, the game responds A with a valid DSA signature. On receiving a reset query rt, set j = 0 and τ = ∅.
If b = 1, the game does the following: If A submits a signing query m, If j = 0 mod 2 Choose k ∈ Z q uniformly at random, compute r = G(g k ) and s = k −1 (H(m) + xr) mod q, and set τ = r andσ = (r, s) Else If (τ, t) / ∈ T , pick t ∈ {0, 1} n uniformly at random, otherwise extract (τ, t) from T , compute k = t mod q, r = G(gk ) and s =k −1 (H(m) + xr ) mod q, and set T = T ∪ {(τ, t)} and σ = (r , s ) j = j + 1 Returnσ If A submits a reset query rt, set j = 0 and τ = ∅ Note that other parts of Game 0 remain unchanged.
Observe now that one can construct a PRF adversary B, which is able to simulate the subverted signing oracle in Game 0 and Game 1, having access to an oracle O ∈ {F(κ, ·), f (·)}. (When the oracle is the real PRF F,k is produced in the same way as Game 0 is described. On the other hand if the oracle is the random function f ,k is produced in the same way as Game 1.) Hence, the difference between the probabilities that the events S 0 and S 1 happen respectively leads to the distinguishing the PRF from the random function. Then, we have
Game 2. This game modifies the subverted signing algorithm in the previous game in a way that when j = 1 mod 2, the existence of (τ, t) in T is not checked and t ∈ {0, 1} n is chosen uniformly at random andk = t mod q is computed.
Let Col be an event that τ j = τ l for some l ≤ Q S . Then, we have
since τ 's are uniform in Z q . Game 3. This game is identical to the previous game except that when A issues a reset query rt, the game does not reset j and τ (to 0 and ∅ respectively) but continues answering A's other queries in the same way it does in Game 2.
Note that in this game, the uniform t ∈ {0, 1} n is generated and assigned tok without depending on the value of τ , (i.e.k is uniform and independent from anything else), the distribution of subverted signaturesσ is identical to that of the real DSA signatures regardless of whether j = 0 mod 2 or j = 1 mod 2. This means that even if the game does not do anything upon receiving the reset query, the distribution of subverted signatures in this game is the same as those in Game 2. Thus, we have
Note also that in this game, due to the fact thatk is uniform and independent from anything else, regardless of whether b = 0 or b = 1, upon submitting signing queries, A will obtain signatures whose distribution is the same as that of DSA. This means A does not get any advantage in guessing b by querying the signing oracle. Therefore, we have 
V. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present the implementation of the subverted DSA scheme presented in the previous section. Our implementation is based on the recent version of Libgcrypt (v1.8.2), a popular cryptographic library developed for the GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) [11] .
Our implementation was performed on Ubuntu 16.04L running on a virtual machine of 2 CPU cores, in which 4096 MB memory was allocated. The CPU of the host PC was Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-7440HQ @ 2.80 GHZ. The OS of the host PC was 64-bit Windows 10 and the memory size was 16 GB. We used primes p and q, whose bit-lengths are 1024 and 160, respectively.
As a benchmark, we performed the signing and verification operations of the original (non-subverted) DSA scheme from Libgcrypt 200,000 times and measured the running time. The result is provided in Table 1 .
Algorithm 1 describes the original signing algorithm of the DSA, denoted DSA_SIGN. We separated the signing procedure of the original DSA into two functions, Genk DSA and Sign DSA , to easily compare with the subverted signing algorithm, which will be described shortly. Genk DSA denotes the generation of randomness k using one of the random number generators, _gcry_dsa_gen_rfc6979_k and _gcry_dsa_gen_k, provided by the original Libgcrypt. Sign DSA is the rest of signing process, which mainly consists of simple arithmetic operations. 
return (r, s)
We then describe our subverted DSA from Section IV as Algorithm 2.
In Algorithm 2, the static global variables κ, τ and j represent the subversion key, the variable for saving a previous signature value and the counter, respectively. When j%2 = 0, the randomness variable k is generated in exactly the same way as done in Algorithm 1, which uses the random number generator provided by Libgcrypt for the regular DSA. On the other hand when j%2 = 1, k is generated by the algorithm Genk AES256 based on the pseudorandom function of our choice (AES), taking κ and τ as input.
We ran the above Algorithm 2 200,000 times (100,000 times each for the cases j%2 = 0 and j%2 = 1) and then measured the average signing time for both cases, which is presented in Table 2 . Notice that the signing time when j%2 = 1 if j%2 = 0 then 13: τ ← r 14 :
return (r, s) is faster than when j%2 = 0. This should not be considered as abnormal since the original random generator in Libgcrypt requires more complex operations to generate secure randomness than the AES encryption, which we chose to implement the PRF F in our subverted DSA scheme.
A. PREVENTING TIMING ANALYSIS
The proven undetectability of the subverted DSA (Theorem 2) guarantees that no party can distinguish the real signatures from subverted ones. However, what this theoretical result does not capture is timing analysis, whereby anyone tries to detect subversion by comparing the running time of a given algorithm, which is supposed to be subverted, with that of the non-subverted one, which is provided as a benchmark.
(Note that there is a similar concept in the literature called ''timing attack'' [15] , which makes it possible for an attacker to measure a time difference between two computational operations in a cryptographic scheme to obtain confidential information such as a secret key.) The timing analysis might be possible against our implementation of the subverted DSA since in the subversion, k andk are generated differently depending on the evaluation of state j: When j%2 = 0, k is created by the random number generator provided by Libgcrypt (i.e. it is generated by Genk DSA ). Otherwise,k is generated by the AES function, which sources randomness from the previous signature value. This difference might lead to a simple detection based on timing analysis. Obviously, the time difference between j%2 = 0 and j%2 = 1 is present in Table 2 . Although the difference is not significant overall, observing a large number of signatures might lead to detection. A simple way to prevent the timing analysis is to make all operations in the algorithm take the same amount of time [15] . For example, we can run both Genk DSA and Genk AES256 to generate k andk, then take one of those values depending on the current state j%2. However, this approach will make the signature generation slower since the random values are generated twice, which can lead to detection while the subverted DSA is running. Since our purpose is to make the subversion remain undetectable even at runtime, we cannot take this approach.
Therefore, we suggest new methods to prevent the timing analysis on our subverted DSA, such as inserting dummy operation and resetting the statue index. The rest of this subsection will explain each method in detail.
Dummy-Operation method. We were able to reduce the running time difference between the cases j%2 = 0 and j%2 = 1 by adding some dummy operation when j%2 = 1. (Fortunately because the running in this case is faster, we could easily ''slow down'' the signature generation.) To achieve this, we carefully measured the extra time required to reduce the time difference and added three extra AES encryptions as a ''dummy operation'', denoted by Dummy() in Algorithm 3. Introducing Dummy() did reduce the difference as shown in Table 3 . It also made the overall signature generation time very close to that of the original DSA (cf. if j%2 = 0 then 7: k ← Genk DSA (Sig key → q) 8:
Dummy() 10 :
if j%2 = 0 then 13: τ ← r 14 :
Index-Reset method. The dummy operation method reduces the time gap between j%2 = 0 and j%2 = 1. In principle, one can ''tune'' the dummy operation to reduce the time difference further, but we found that it is hard to realize this in practice. To achieve our goal, we introduce an ''index-reset'' method, which sometimes resets the index j to 0. As described in Algorithm 4, every -th index is set to 0, where is a random integer of a certain size. (As shown in Algorithm 4, the value of j is set to −1 when j%2 = 0 to reset the index j. Since j is increased by 1 in line 15, it will reset the index j to 0 at the end of the procedure.) This effectively skips the faster signature generation with AES256 when the index is odd (i.e., j%2 = 1) and replaces it with a slower signature generation with the random number generator provided by the original DSA in Libgcrypt.
This idea is based on our observation that when a small number of signatures are generated, the difference between execution time of signature generations when j is even or odd is not significant, however if the number of generated signatures becomes bigger, say more than 100,000, the difference becomes noticeable. Therefore, by omitting the faster subverted signature generation based on AES, we could make the average signature generation time very much close to that of the original DSA. Note that this does not mean that the subverted signing algorithm omits to sign a particular message, but it rather means that a message is signed by a different subroutine in the algorithm. if j%2 = 0 then 8:
if j% = 0 then Dummy() 14 :
(r, s) ← Sign DSA (Sig key , m, k) 16 :
return (r, s) Table 4 shows the running time of signature generation when both the dummy operation and index-reset methods are applied.
It should be noted that the index-reset method merely affects the performance of the implementation and still allows us to extract a private signing key from consecutive subverted signatures. This can be shown as follows. If our subverted DSA scheme is reset during the execution, there are only two cases depending on whether j%2 = 0 or j%2 = 1 for index j for the current state. If the algorithm is reset after it generates the signature with index j%2 = 0, the next two signatures are generated with indices j%2 = 0 and j%2 = 1, respectively, since we choose because the reset make the signing operation start from j = 0. (We assume that the resets do not occur immediately one another by choosing of a certain size.) Therefore, the sequence of j%2 is as follows:
where the sequences after the reset are boldfaced. This implies that the longest sequence of j%2 which is absent from subverted signatures that can lead to the private key extraction is 1 0 0, where 0 denotes the index that has been reset. If one more signature immediately after ''0'' is collected, one can extract the private key. Therefore, if maximum four subverted signatures are collected, the private key can be extracted.
If the algorithm is reset after it generates the signature with index j%2 = 1, it is obvious that it does not affect the private key extraction as the sequence of j%2 will be the following:
which is the same as the original sequence of index for subverted signatures.
To sum up, even when the index-reset is in place, the private key can readily be extracted.
We remark that as proven in Theorem 2, state resets do not affect the undetectability of the subverted DSA. This implies that the index-reset method, which essentially triggers resets on purpose, does not affect the undetectability either.
Summary of the performance. Note that the average running time for signature generation of the original DSA is 311.7 µs as shown in Table 1 . Using the dummy-operation method, we achieved the running time 313.1 µs (Table 3) . This is slightly slow, but it cannot easily be noticeable and could be regarded as a system noise. The index-reset method gave the better result of running time 311.8 µs as shown in Table 4 . Note that under this method, the signature generation time for each message does not vary depending on state, as compared with the implementation without timing analysis prevention measure (Algorithm 2). To sum up, our methods effectively prevent the timing analysis giving the signature generation time very close to the benchmark signing time, 311.7 µs of the original DSA.
Comparison with asymmetric subversion. Compared with our subversion on the DSA, the subversion proposed in [16] could naturally be detectable by timing analysis. Although their subverted signatures are theoretically indistinguishable from the original signatures, the signing algorithm exhibits a noticeable delay because their subverted singing algorithm needs to perform extra exponentiation over a group every time a signature is generated for asymmetric subversion. We estimated that due to the extra exponentiation operation, their subverted signing would take well above 500 µs when the Libgcrypt is used. This is almost 1.5 times slower than the original signing time of DSA. Therefore, in practice, their subversion can easily be detected by measuring the signature generation time and comparing with a benchmark for the DSA. Our subverted DSA scheme does not have this problem.
B. CONSIDERING SIGNATURE LOSS
In the next experiment, we consider the real world situation in which the adversary has some difficulty in collecting consecutive signatures. If the adversary can obtain three consecutive signatures, he can definitely recover the private key. However, in practice, he may not be able to get consecutive signatures easily. He can only eavesdrop on a few channels among many, which will make it hard for him to obtain consecutive signatures out of all the distributed signatures. We adopt a probabilistic model to reflect this situation. In our model, we assign a certain probability to each subverted signature (from the victim's machine). This probability is represented by a loss rate. For example, if the loss rate is 95%, many signatures are marked as ''loss'' and do not arrive at the adversary's computer. Then the adversary needs to collect more subverted signatures to successfully extract the private key. Our result shows that in reality, collecting enough signatures (two or three signatures depending on the j value) is not a very restrictive requirement. Fig. 1 shows the relationship between a probability that one can successfully recover a private key and the number of required subverted signatures. It shows the experimental quantiles of the number of signatures required to extract a signing key in each probabilistic scenario. Each curve in the graph represents a probability of successful extractions. The required number of subverted signatures increases as the loss rate increases. For example, if the adversary has gathered about 56 subverted signatures under 95% loss rate, he can recover the private key x with probability 0.8 (80%), which is represented by the first square dot in the green line in Fig. 1 . The number of required signatures to be collected decreases rapidly as the loss rate does as shown in Fig. 1 . 2 demonstrates the number of subverted signatures that are required on average to successfully recover a signing key depending on various loss rates. This result can be used to demonstrate the expected resources to extract a private key and it shows that even with high loss rate of 95%, only about 36 signatures are needed for an extracted signing key on average. Consequently, it takes the adversary only about 25.9 ms to work out a signing key. It should be noted that this is computed using average signing, verification and extraction times. For each trial, the adversary signs any message and verifies the signature using a known verification key. If it is verified successfully, then the adversary gets a valid signing key. The time taken to extract the key from two subverted signatures is 50.1 µs. The execution time will decrease rapidly as the adversary gathers signatures more reliably without big losses (i.e., the loss rate decreases).
To summarize, our experiment demonstrates that requiring at most three consecutive signatures does not limit the practicality of our subverted DSA scheme. Even in the environment where many subverted signatures are lost in transmission, the adversary can still extract private signing keys utilizing a relatively small number of collected signatures.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have presented our subverted DSA scheme which realizes ASA on the DSA and provided its implementation based on the Libgcrypt library. We have demonstrated that subverted signatures generated from the subverted DSA scheme can be utilized to recover the private signing key from very few signatures. Our experiment shows that even if many subverted signatures are lost en route to the adversary, the private key can still be extracted efficiently.
As with the case of other ASAs in the literature, a lesson learned from our result is that care must be taken to employ black box cryptography. Our result also confirms that randomized cryptographic schemes can be more vulnerable to subversion attacks since the randomness used in such schemes can be a vehicle for Big Brother to embed a backdoor, as demonstrated in a number of subversion attacks in the literature. Moreover, our result demonstrates that the structures of the discrete-logarithm based signatures are particularly vulnerable to exploitation. (Note that the structural fragility of DSA was well demonstrated by the attack on the DSA implementation in the Sony PlayStation3, in which a new ephemeral exponent, say k, failed to be uniformly random [7] .) We expect that other similar discrete-logarithm based signatures can be subverted in a similar way as presented in this paper.
As discussed in Section II, the research community has come up with a few solutions to defend cryptography against ASA, which includes using deterministic cryptographic primitives and offline components. Our concern, however, is that solutions based on ASA framework may not cover all kind of the attempts that weaken cryptographic protocols as elaborated by Schneier et al. [23] . Another concern is that many cryptographic algorithms (such as RSA, ElGamal and DSA) are widely deployed and it will be hard to persuade users to replace what they are currently using, in a short period.
As a short-term solution, we then suggest that a proper selftest routine to detect any unauthorized changes in cryptographic implementations should be added. Also, it is essential to remind the users of cryptographic libraries 1) to use the versions of software which are legitimately distributed and 2) to check the integrity of sources or binaries proactively before using them.
In the long term, we envision that such a discipline as ''software engineering for cryptography'', which was put forward by Schneier et al. [23] , is urgently needed to extend the efforts on providing implementation security [1] , [8] and finding bugs or problems [14] to preserve the security and privacy that cryptography can bring us.
APPENDIX

A. OUR SUBVERTED SCHNORR SIGNATURE SCHEME
As an additional application of our technique, we present an ASA on Schnorr by constructing a subverted Schnorr scheme. The main idea of the construction is similar to the subverted DSA scheme: A nonce of every (j + 1)-th DSA signature (for j mod 2 = 0) is generated by computing a PRF output taking the subversion key and the first component of the j-th signature (generated legitimately) as input. A formal description follows.
Let SNR = (Gen SNR , Sign SNR , Verify SNR ) denote the Schnorr signature scheme. The key generation algorithm Gen SNR produces pk = (G, q, g, y, H) and sk = (G, q, g, x, H) , where G is a cyclic group of prime order q, generated by g, y = g x for uniform random x ∈ Z q and H : {0, 1} * → Z q is a cryptographic hash function. (This is assumed as a random oracle [5] in the security analysis [20] .) Taking a message m and a private key x as input, the signing algorithm Sign SNR generates a signature σ = (r, s) such that e = H(m, r), where r = g k for uniform k ∈ Z q , and s = k +xe mod q. Taking a message m, a signature σ = (r, s) and a public key pk as input, the verification algorithm Verify SNR computes g s y −e and checks whether e = H(m, g s y −e ).
Using this scheme, we can construct a subverted Schnorr signature scheme SNR = (Gen SNR , Sign SNR , Verify SNR ) as follows:
• Subversion key generation Gen SNR : Taking 1 as input, select a PRF F : {0, 1} × G → Z q , pick κ ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random and return subk = (descF, κ), where ''descF'' denotes the description of F.
• Subverted sign Sign SNR : Taking sk = (G, q, g, x, H) of SNR, a message m, a private signing key x and a subversion key subk = (F, κ) and state ι = (j, τ ) as input, where j and τ are initialized to 0, perform the following: If j = 0 mod 2 Pick k ∈ Z q uniformly at random and compute r = g k , e = H(m, r) and
Note that the above scheme maintains state j (meaning it is stateful) but the subverted signing algorithm never outputs the state nor does it take the state as input. -It is only used internally. Unlike the subverted signature schemes in the literature [2] , [30] , [31] , the state need not be communicated to the adversary to conduct further attacks like key extraction.
Note also that the subverted verification algorithm is exactly the same as the original verification algorithm of the Schnorr signature scheme, which is a required property to prove undetectability in the next subsection.
Key extraction. The key extraction process is highly efficient in that any pair of consecutive subverted signatures, which starts with even index j can reveal the private signing key x. (Recall that consecutive signatures are the signatures generated one after another.) If j is an odd number, i.e. j = 1 mod 2, extraction will fail. However, this can easily be overcome by sampling three consecutive subverted signatures so that if the first two signatures fail to extract the signing key and last pair can be chosen to extract it successfully. The following theorem formally proves the above argument.
Theorem 3: Suppose that three consecutive signatures output by the subverted Schnorr signature scheme SNR are given. Then, the signing key of the SNR signature scheme can be extracted with probability 1.
Proof: Suppose that an adversary B obtains three consecutive subverted Schnorr signatures for three messages. by the subverted signing algorithm, the above algorithm succeeds in extracting the private key x. Hence, B successfully extracts the signing key with probability 1. When j = 0 mod 2, B can useσ j+1 andσ j+2 to extract the signing key in a similar way as shown in the proof of Theorem 1. Hence, Adv extract B,SNR (λ) = 1. Undetectability. We could also show that the proposed subverted Schnorr signature scheme is undetectable as stated in the following theorem, whose proof is very similar to that of Theorem 2. 
